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A RTICLE 18 of the New York Insurance Law became effective on
February 1, 1974.1 This new law, designated as the "Comprehen-
sive Automobile Insurance Reparations Act,"'2 establishes a so-called
"no-fault" auto reparations system for the State of New York. 3
In essence, the new law requires New York motorists to carry
certain "first party" insurance coverage4 in addition to the liability
insurance coverage that has been required of state motorists for a
number of years. 5 Persons insured under the new coverage are af-
forded protection for up to $50,000 of out-of-pocket loss resulting from
motor vehicle accidents. Within that dollar limit benefits will be
provided, regardless of fault, 6 for the following: reasonable and neces-
sary medical, hospital, rehabilitative and related expenses; 7 loss of
earnings up to $1,000 per month for not more than three years from
the date of the accident; 8 and, "all other reasonable and necessary
expenses incurred, up to twenty-five dollars per day for not more than
one year from the date of the accident . . . ."
In addition to requiring the purchase of first party insurance protec-
tion, the new law also provides for certain restrictions upon the right
* B.A., J.D., St. John's University. During the 1972-1973 session of the New York State
Legislature, Mr. Hart served as legislative counsel to the New York Bar Association's Au-
tomobile Accident Reparations Committee. He also served on the Legal Advisory Cammittee to
the Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York. Mr. Hart is currently a member of the
firm Curtis, Hart & Zaklukiewicz in Merrick, New York.
1. New York Comprehensive Automobile Insurance Reparations Act, Law of Feb 13, 1973,
ch. 13, [1973] N.Y. Laws 196th Sess. 56 (codified at N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 670-77 (McKinney Supp.
1974)).
2. N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 670-77 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
3. For a short history of no-fault in New York see Note. No-Fault Insurance in New York:
Another Hazard for the Innocent Driver, 40 Brooklyn L. Rev. 689, 689-91 (1974) (hereinafter
cited as No-Fault Note].
4. N.Y. Ins. Law § 672(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
5. Id.; see N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law §§ 310-21 (McKinney 1970).
6. The Act allows the insurer to exclude from coverage persons who: intentionally injure
themselves; are injured while driving under the influence of liquor or drugs; are injured while
committing a felony or resisting a lawful arrest; are injured while racing; are injured while
knowingly operating a stolen vehicle. N.Y. Ins. Law § 672(2) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
7. Id. § 671(1)(a).
8. Id. § 671(1)(b).
9. Id. § 671(1)(c).
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of persons injured in New York motor vehicle accidents to pursue a
traditional tort remedy. Actions for pain, suffering and similar non-
economic losses arising out of motor vehicle accidents occurring in the
state may only be maintained in the courts of the state in cases of
"serious injury."' 0
The purpose of this Article is to consider some of the constitutional
arguments which may be raised to challenge this new law, rather than
to provide a detailed analysis of the features of the law itself. How-
ever, specific provisions of the new law will be discussed for the
purpose of constitutional analysis. "1I Although the concept of "no-fault" automobile insurance is relatively
new in the State of New York, other states have been experimenting
with similar systems for a longer period of time. 12 At this writing,
New York is one of twenty-three states which have adopted some form
of insurance system to modify the manner in which automobile acci-
dent victims are compensated for their injuries. 13 Insight into the
various constitutional attacks to which the New York statute may be
subjected, and their possible resolution, may be obtained from deci-
sions in other jurisdictions which have considered some of the constitu-
tional questions raised. 14 This Article will use the "no-fault" cases
10. Id. § 673(1); see, note 19 infra and accompanying text.
11. For a comprehensive examination of the New York Law see Comment, New York
Adopts No-Fault: A Summary and Analysis, 37 Albany L. Rev. 662 (1973).
12. Thirteen other states had some kind of no-fault law prior to the effective date of the New
York law. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 38-319 to -351a (Supp. 1974) (effective Jan. 1973); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 21, § 2118 (Supp. 1972) (effective Jan. 1972); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 627.730-.741
(1972) (effective Jan. 1972); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-3101 to -3121 (1973) (effective Jan. 1974); Md.
Ann. Code art. 48A, §§ 538-46 (Supp. 1974) (effective Jan. 1973); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 90,
§ 34M, ch. 175, § 113B, ch. 231, § 6D (Supp. 1973) (effective Jan. 1971); Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. §§ 500.3101-.3179 (Supp. 1974) (effective Oct. 1973); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 39:6A-1 to -20
(1973) (effective Jan. 1973); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 743.800-.835 (Supp. 1974) (effective Jan. 1972);
S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. §§ 58-23-6 to -8 (Supp. 1974) (effective Jan. 1972); Tex. Ins. Code
Ann. arts. 5.06-3 (Supp. 1974) (effective Aug. 1973); Utah Code Ann. §§ 31-41-1 to -13 (Supp.
1973) (effective Jan. 1974); Va. Code Ann. §§ 38.1-380.1, -380.2 (Supp. 1974) (effective July
1972). See generally Ghiardi & Kircher, Automobile Insurance Reparations Plans: An Analysis of
Eight Existing Laws, 55 Marq. L. Rev. 1 (1972).
13. In addition to those listed in note 12 supra, the following statutes have effective dates no
earlier than New York's. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 66-4014 to -4021 (Supp. 1973) (effective July
1974); Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 294-1 to -39 (Supp. 1973) (effective July 1974); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§§ 698.010-.510 (1973) (effective Feb. 1974); ch. 94, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 334 (effective Apr.
1974); Act No. 783, Laws of Georgia [1974] (effective Mar. 1, 1975); ch. 385, [1974] Ky. Acts 752
(effective July 1975); ch. 408, [1974] Minn. Laws 762 (effective Jan. 1975); Act No. 176, Laws of
Pa. [1974], §§ 101-701 (effective July 19, 1975). See also Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, §§ 1065.150-.163
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974) (effective Jan. 1972), which was held unconstitutional in part in Grace
v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972). See text accompanying notes 66-67 infra.
14. See, e.g., Note, Insurance-Constitutionality of No-Fault Insurance Statutes-The
Illinois Plan, 19 Wayne L. Rev. 1277, 1278-80 (1973).
from other jurisdictions as well as general constitutional authority to
attempt to forecast what may happen if the New York law is subjected
to constitutional scrutiny.
The limited history of constitutional challenges to "no-fault" laws
reveals that arguments advanced against these laws basically center on
alleged violations of the due process and equal protection provisions of
the federal and state constitutions. This Article will, therefore, con-
sider the protections afforded by those provisions and their application
to specific sections of the new auto reparation law in New York.
II. DUE PROCESS
The basic test employed to determine whether given legislation
violates the guarantee of due process of law under the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution or under a state constitu-
tion is to consider whether the statute in question bears a reasonable
relation to a legitimate legislative objective.' s When a court applies
this test, a statute is presumed to be constitutional 16 and, furthermore,
if a state of facts can be found to justify the passage of the statute,
such facts will be presumed to have existed at the time the legislation
was enacted. 17 With these general tests in mind, their application to
specific provisions of the New York law may be considered.
A. Does the Limitation on Tort Rights Bear Any Reasonable
Relation to a Legitimate Legislative Objective?
The New York law denies an automobile accident victim injured in
that state a right to recover in a tort action for what it terms
"non-economic loss,"'1 except in those cases in which there are
specified types of personal injury or in which the injury results in a
specified amount of expense for medical, hospital and related services.
Those exceptions are delineated in the act to include injury:
15. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502, 525 (1934); Manzanares v. Bell, - Kan. -, 522 P.2d 1291, 1303 (1974). In Pinnick v
Cleary, - Mass. -, -, 271 N.E.2d 592, 601-02 (1971), plaintiff challenged the Massachusetts
no-fault statute. In upholding the statute's constitutionality, the court applied a rational basis
test, rejecting a compelling interest argument. See Kenney, No-Fault in Massachusetts-An
Epilogue, 56 Mass. L.Q. 441, 443 (1971); Note, No-Fault in the Courts: A Constitutional
Perspective, 50 N.D.L. Rev. 117, 121-22 (1973); 40 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 851-54 (1971)1
16. "[T]he presumption is in favor of every legislative act, and... the whole burden of proof
lies on him who denies it constitutionality." Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 436
(1827). See also Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973); Pinnick v.
Cleary, - Mass. -, -, 271 N.E.2d 592, 601 (1971); Van Berkle v. Power, 16 N.Y.2d 37, 40,
209 N.E.2d 539, 541, 261 N.Y.S.2d 876, 878-79 (1965); 21 Catholic U.L. Rev 421, 431 (1972).
17. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 132 (1876); Manzanares v. Bell, - Kan. -, -, 522 P.2d
1291, 1303 (1974).
18. N.Y. Ins. Law § 673(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974). "Non-economic loss" is defined as "pain
and suffering and similar non-monetary detriment." Id. § 671(3).
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(a) which results in death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement; a compound or
comminuted fracture; or permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function, or
system; or
(b) if the reasonable and customary charges for medical, hospital, surgical, nursing,
dental, ambulance, x-ray, prescription drug and prosthetic services necessarily per-
formed as a result of the injury would exceed five hundred dollars.' 9
This limitation on the right to a tort remedy to specific types of
injury or the amount of medical and related expense generally is
referred to as a "threshold provision" in the parlance of "no-fault"
plans. The question to be considered is whether New York's use of a
threshold is unconstitutional on due process grounds. 20
A similar threshold provision2 t was considered by the Massachusetts
supreme court in Pinnick v. Cleary.22 There the court held that since
one of the purposes of the Massachusetts law was to reduce court
congestion through elimination of minor claims for "pain and suffer-
ing" and since the threshold provision was intended to eliminate these
cases from the courts, the threshold was reasonably related to the
objective of the law. 23
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in an advisory
opinion, was asked to consider the constitutional propriety of a
threshold provision in a "no-fault" bill then pending before the state's
legislature. 2 4 Reasoning that an injured person was not left without a
remedy under the proposed law, 25 the New Hampshire court held that
the bill's threshold provision was related to the purpose of reducing
court congestion by eliminating claims for minor "pain and
suffering."' 26 The court found that there would be no violation of due
process attendant to the threshold's use. 27
The Florida supreme court, in Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Co., 28
also was called upon to consider a due process challenge to the
threshold provision 29 in that state's "no-fault" law. The court stated:
19. Id. §§ 671(4)(a), (b).
20. For a discussion of various types of threshold requirements and the inequities which may
accompany them, see Ring, The Fault With "No-Fault," 49 Notre Dame Law. 796, 803-07
(1974).
21. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 231, § 6D (Supp. 1973).
22. - Mass. -, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971), noted in 55 Marq. L. Rev. 198 (1972); 40 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 849 (1971).
23. - Mass. at -, 271 N.E.2d at 609-10; see Byrd, No-Fault for North Carolina-A
Pending Proposal, 52 N.C.L. Rev. 245, 262-64 (1973). But see Ring, The Fault with "No-Fault,"
49 Notre Dame Law. 796, 820-24 (1974); No-Fault Note, supra note 3, at 698-700.
24. Opinion of the Jusices, - N.H. -, 304 A.2d 881 (1973).
25. Id. at -, 304 A.2d at 886.
26. Id. at-, 304 A.2d at 886.
27. Id. at -, 304 A.2d at 887.
28. 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
29. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.737 (1972).
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The threshold requirements, taken in connection with the provisions for first-party
payment of claims for such items as medical expenses and loss of income, will obviate
the necessity to bring a cause of action in many cases, thereby reducing court
congestion and delay and assuring prompt reimbursement of essential losses. A
reasonable relationship to permissible legislative objectives is also present here.3 0
It would appear that, based upon the reasoning of other courts, the
New York courts would be unlikely to find that the threshold provi-
sion in the New York "no-fault" law3 ' does not bear a reasonable
relation to a legitimate legislative objective-reducing delay in the
state courts. 32 By limiting the class of automobile accident victims who
will be able to pursue a tort remedy, the number of cases potentially
facing the court system of the state is reduced.33 It would be difficult to
present a convincing argument for the proposition that the New York
legislature does not have a legitimate interest in improving the court
backlog problems in the state. It could be argued that there were other
means open to the New York legislature to remedy the problem of
crowded courts. However, a court considering the constitutionality of
the law on due process grounds is not guided by whether the best
possible approach to a problem has been taken. 34
B. Does the Act Impair "Vested" Property Rights or Impinge
Upon the Right to Personal Security?
Even though legislation may pass the due process test by being
found to bear a reasonable relation to some permissible legislative
30. 296 So. 2d at 17.
31. See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
32. Additional objectives are to reduce insurance premiums and to assure economic aid in
meeting expenses associated with automobile related injuries. The legislative objective in Kansas
was determined " 'to provide a means of compensating persons promptly for accidental bodily
injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of motor vehicles in lieu of
liability for damages .... .' " Manzanares v. Bell, - Kan. -, -, 522 P.2d 1291, 1307 (1974),
quoting § 2 of Kansas Senate Bill 918. It also has been suggested that no-fault can save lives by
promoting and paying for the building and operation of emergency medical facilities. Hart,
National No-Fault Auto Insurance: The People Need It Now, 21 Catholic U.L. Rev. 259. 291-94
(1972).
33. Several commentators, however, have argued that the no-fault plans will not substan-
tially reduce court congestion. No-Fault Note 698-700; see Ghiardi & Kircher, Automobile
Insurance: An Analysis of the Massachusetts Plan, 21 Syracuse L. Rev. 1135, 1139-40 (1970).
Chief Judge Tauro, concurring in Pinnick v. Cleary, - Mass. -. 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971), felt
that motor vehicle tort cases were, at best, a minor cause of court congestion and questioned the
emphasis placed on this factor by the majority. Id. at -, 271 N.E.2d at 615-17 (Tauro, C. J.,
concurring). In Manzanares v. Bell, - Kan. -, 522 P.2d 1291 (1974), the parties had stipulated
that there was no serious court congestion problem, and this was supported by the available
statistics. Id. at-, 522 P.2d at 1320 (Prager, J., concurring & dissenting). Whether no-fault will
prove successful in relieving any part of the burden on the courts remains to be seen. It
admittedly is "experimental." Pinnick v. Cleary, - Mass. -, -, 271 N.E.2d 592, 617 (1971).
34. See New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917).
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objective, it may be open to due process attack on other grounds. The
plaintiff in Pinnick v. Cleary35 claimed that the limitation on tort
recovery in the Massachusetts law interfered with a "vested property
right" which could not be disposed of or altered by legislative action
because of due process guarantees. The court responded to the claim
by stating:
[T]he plaintiff seems to ignore the distinction between a cause of action which has
accrued and the expectation which every citizen has if a legal wrong should occur to
find redress according to the rules of statutory and common law applicable at that
time.3 6
In other words, the claim that a "no-fault" law's provisions ad-
versely affected a "vested property right" to a tort remedy would have
merit if the law's application were such as to bar or severely restrict
causes of action which accrued prior to its effective date. However, if
the law only applies to accidents and injuries occurring on or after its
effective date, there would be no interference with vested property
rights. 37 As has been stated by the United States Supreme Court: "No
person has a vested interest in any rule of law entitling him to insist
that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit."'38
Since the New York law's threshold provision applies only to
accidents and injuries occurring after its effective date, 39 it is difficult
to support a claim that potential auto accident victims who, but for the
law, could have brought suit for "pain and suffering" damages at
common law will be denied some vested property right. 40 Any rights
an accident victim may have are determined by the laws existing in the
state at the time of the accident, not those which existed at some time
prior thereto. It is the legislature's purpose and prerogative to shape
the laws to suit certain situations. If the common law is altered
35. - Mass. -, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971).
36. Id. at -, 271 N.E.2d at 599. The Massachusetts court went even further in declaring
that there is no vested property right in any common law action. Id. at -, 271 N.E.2d at 599; see
21 Catholic U.L. Rev. 421, 428 (1972).
37. See 55 Marq. L. Rev. 198, 200 (1972). But cf. No-Fault Note 702-03, where it Is
suggested that the New York Court of Appeals might be unwilling to accept the proposition that
the surrender of a right to sue is not a deprivation of a vested property right.
38. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917). See also Arizona Employers'
Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400, 419-20 (1919).
39. Law of Feb. 13, 1973, ch. 13, § 11, [19731 N.Y. Laws 65 (effective Feb. 1, 1974), codified
in N.Y. Ins. Law § 677 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
40. An argument has been made that the limitation of actions in tort may be an abrogation of
the right to trial by jury. No-Fault Note 703-04; 26 Okla. L. Rev. 73, 78 (1973); cf. 8 Gonzaga L.
Rev. 146, 152 (1972). But see Comment, No-Fault Insurance in Kentucky-A Constitutional
Analysis, 62 Ky. L.J. 590, 592-95 (1974), where the issue is analyzed, but no violation of the right
to jury trial is found.
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somewhat in the process, there is no constitutional problem as long as
causes of action which have already accrued are unaffected. 4 1
In relation to a threshold's application, it may be argued that every
person has a fundamental right to "personal security and bodily
integrity" which is constitutionally protected and cannot be limited
without a clear demonstration of some compelling state interest. This
argument was considered by the court in Pinnick, where it found that
even if there were such a fundamental right, it was not affected by the
state's "no-fault" law because that law
merely limits the common law right in the automobile accident situation to obtain
money damages on account of unintentionally inflicted pain and suffering and modifies
the procedure for obtaining damages according to the common law measure for all
other elements of recovery.
42
The Massachusetts court then, does not consider the limitations of a
"no-fault" plan upon a tort suit as constituting a restriction upon the
right to personal security or bodily integrity. Rather, it views the law
as shaping the measure of recovery for those whose rights have been
interfered with as a result of tortious conduct.
C. Does the New Law Establish an Adequate Substitute Remedy
for the Limited Tort Right?
There is authority for the proposition that a state may not com-
pletely abolish a cause of action for injuries without substituting
another adequate remedy in its place. 43 Some doubt is raised as to the
validity of this argument when one considers the Supreme Court
decision upholding the constitutionality of a state guest statute. 4
41. Manzanares v. Bell, - Kan. -, -, 522 P.2d 1291, 1301 (1974); Pinnick v. Cleary, -
Mass. -, -, 271 N.E.2d 592, 599-600 (1971); cf. Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187
U.S. 437, 439 (1903). See also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876).
42. Pinnick v. Cleary, - Mass. -, -, 271 N.E.2d 592, 600 (1971).
43. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917); Nistendirk v. McGee, 225 F.
Supp. 881, 882 (W.D. Mo. 1963); Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973). This has been the
law with respect to contract remedies for many )-ears. Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187
U.S. 437, 439 (1903). The rule has been applied to property damage causes of action. Crane v.
Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142, 147 (1922); see I. Schermer, Automobile Liability Insurance § 6.02 at 6-8
(1974). There is also authority, however, for the proposition that a common law cause of action
may be abolished if the legislature has sufficient reason. E.g., Hanfgarn v. Mark, 274 N.Y. 22, 8
N.E.2d 47, appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 641 (1937) (per curiam) (involving the statutory abolition
of causes of action for alienation of affection, criminal conversation, seduction and breach of
promise to marry); see Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929); cf. Kenney, No-Fault in
Massachusetts-An Epilogue, 56 Mass. L.Q. 441, 444-47 (1971). An analogy has often been
drawn to workmen's compensation, which also mandates that the injured party take the alternate
remedy provided. 21 Catholic U.L. Rev. 421, 433-34 (1972); Note, Insurance-Constitutionality
of No-Fault Insurance Statutes-The Illinois Plan, 19 Wayne L. Rev. 1277. 1279 (1973).
44. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929). However, it has been suggested that automobile
19741 NO-FA ULT
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Nevertheless, it would appear likely that the creation of a first party
auto insurance system should be considered an adequate substitute for
the tort remedy limited by the New York law. In Manzanares v.
Bell,4S the court, confronted with an attack on the constitutionality of
the tort limitations, including a threshold, found an adequate substi-
tute remedy in its state's "no-fault" law.4 6 The court agreed with the
decision in Pinnick as to the ability of a legislature to alter the
common law remedies as long as accrued causes of action were not
affected. It considered the insurance mechanism for automobile acci-
dent reparations established by the law as an appropriate substitute
remedy for the one previously available to Kansas residents. 47
The court in Pinnick also had considered the "substitute remedy"
approach. 48 It reasoned that the trade-off of tort rights for immediate
and sure compensation without regard to fault provided the accident
victim with an adequate substitute remedy. In this regard, the lan-
guage of the Supreme Court in New York Central R.R. v. White49 is
persuasive:
The statute under consideration sets aside one body of rules only to establish another
system in its place. If the employee is no longer able to recover as much as before in
case of being injured through the employer's negligence, he is entitled to moderate
compensation in all cases of injury, and has a certain and speedy remedy without the
difficulty and expense of establishing negligence or proving the amount of the
damages.5 0
Although the Court was there considering the constitutionality of a
workmen's compensation law, the application of its logic to a "no-
fault" situation is compelling. s l The New York law does restrict
certain tort remedies.5 2 However, the compensation system it estab-
guest statutes are a poor analogy because they are outdated and involve a situation where there Is
a special relationship between the parties. No-Fault Note 717-18.
45. - Kan. -, 522 P.2d 1291 (1974).
46. Id. at -, 522 P.2d at 1301; accord, Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 15 (Fla.
1974); Opinion of the Justices, - N.H. -, 304 A.2d 881 (1973).
47. Manzanares v. Bell, - Kan. -, -, 522 P.2d 1291, 1301 (1974); accord, Opinion of the
Justices, - N.H. -, -, 304 A.2d 881, 885 (1973). "[T]he Kansas No-Fault Act assures all motor
vehicle accident victims of prompt, efficient payment of certain economic losses. To the extent
there is a limitation on a person's ability to recover non-pecuniary damages, the rights received in
exchange are no less adequate." Manzanares v. Bell, supra at -, 522 P.2d at 1301.
48. Pinnick v. Cleary, - Mass. -, -, 271 N.E.2d 592, 605-07 (1971).
49. 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
50. Id. at 201.
51. This analogy was drawn in Manzanares v. Bell, - Kan. -, -, 522 P.2d 1291, 1304
(1974); Opinion of the Justices, - N.H. -, -, 304 A.2d 881, 886 (1973); Pinnick v. Cleary, -
Mass. -, -, 271 N.E.2d 592, 602 (1971). But see Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973);
I. Schermer, Automobile Liability Insurance § 6.02, at 6-8 (1974).
52. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
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lishes provides speed and certainty of remedy53 in place of the slow,
uncertain and costly tort process.
D. Does the Law's Compulsory First Party Insurance Mechanism
Deprive Persons of Property Without Due Process?
It may be claimed that requiring a person to carry first party
insurance coverage as a condition precedent to operation of a vehicle
on the roads of New York amounts to deprivation of property without
due process. This particular argument would appear to have little
weight in New York because of its history of compulsory automobile
liability insurance. However, liability insurance laws such as New
York's generally have been viewed as enactments for the benefit of
persons who may be injured by an insured. "No-fault" laws, on the
other hand, have been viewed as being intended to benefit the insured.
The difference in the forms of insurance did not cause concern to the
court in Manzanares when it was confronted with a "deprivation of
property without due process" attack on the Kansas law:
The argument is one of policy, not law .... It is axiomatic that if the police power of
the state may be exercised to minimize the consequences of collisions and accidents, it
likewise may be exercised to require a method of compensating promptly persons who
suffer accidental bodily injury arising out of a motor vehicle accident. The require-
ment of purchasing insurance for the protection of others has long been held not to
violate the due process guarantee.- 4
The Kansas court reasoned that compulsory "no-fault" insurance is no
different from any other type of self-protecting legislation, such as that
which requires motorcyclists to wear safety helmets or that which
requires compulsory self-insurance under the Social Security system.
E. Does the Act Impair the Fundamental Right to Travel?
It also may be claimed that the requirement that insurance be
purchased as a condition to the operation of a motor vehicle uncon-
stitutionally impairs the fundamental right of citizens of this country to
freedom of movement. 55 This argument was raised by the plaintiff in
Manzanares.5 6 The court agreed that the freedom to travel was a
fundamental right which cannot be impaired without some showing of
53. N.Y. Ins. Law § 675(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974) pmvides in part "Payments of first party
benefits shall be made as the loss is incurred. Such benefits are overdue if not paid within thirty
days after the claimant supplies proof of the fact and amount of loss sustained." Id. § 675(2)
provides for arbitration in the event of dispute over the insurer's liability.
54. Manzanares v. Bell, - Kan. -, -, 522 P.2d 1291. 1303 (1974).
55. See generally Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160 (1941); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
56. - Kan. at -, 522 P.2d at 1301.
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compelling state interest. However, it reasoned that the right to travel
does not necessarily encompass the freedom to travel by car. "The
right to operate a motor vehicle ... is a privilege, not a natural right,
and that privilege is subject to reasonable regulation. '57 The court
expressed the belief that the state's "no-fault" law merely was another
regulation regarding the operation and use of motor vehicles in the
state. It stated that "authorities are unanimous that under the police
power the state may regulate travel upon the public highways." 58
In the same regard, a recent Michigan trial court decision which
considered that state's "no-fault" law5 9 found that there was no
authority to support the proposition that the fundamental right to
travel encompasses the right to travel by automobile.
60
F. Conclusion-Due Process
From an analysis of the New York law and the due process
authorities which may be considered in relation to that law, it appears
that the law should not be found unconstitutional on the basis of any
of the challenges discussed above. The various provisions of the law
which could be challenged have a reasonable relationship to legitimate
legislative objectives. The law does not deprive persons of life, liberty
or property without due process of law. While it may be argued that
the New York legislature could have selected some other or better
means to deal with the problems which this law was intended to
correct, that is not determinative. 6I The question is whether the means
chosen are reasonably related to legitimate legislative objectives. With
this no one can seriously argue.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION
Disposing of possible due process attacks upon the New York law
does not resolve all of its potential constitutional problems. The
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
no state may deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of its laws. Since other states have found their "no-fault" laws
57. Id. at-, 522 P.2d at 1302.
58. Id. at -, 522 P.2d at 1302.
59. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 500.3101-3179 (Supp. 1974).
60. Shavers v. Kelly, Civil No. 73-248-068-CZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct. May 20, 1974); see,
Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 23 (Fla. 1974); Johnson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
297 So. 2d 858, 861 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
61. "Our recent decisions make plain that we do not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the
wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether the policy which it expresses offends the public
welfare." Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952). See also Arizona
Employers' Liab. Cases, 250 U.S. 400, 419 (1919).
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challenged on equal protection grounds, it may be anticipated that the
New York law will be subject to similar attacks.
The equal protection clause prohibits certain legislative
classifications. Generally speaking, a legislative classification is con-
stitutional unless it can be demonstrated that it bears no reasonable
relation to the legitimate purpose of the law. 62 Therefore, there are
two tests which must be employed to determine whether a law runs
afoul of the equal protection clause. First, it must be examined to
determine if there are, in fact, legislative classifications-that is,
different classes of persons afforded different treatment. Second, if
classification is found, a determination must be made as to whether it
bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate purpose of the law.
As with the consideration of the due process arguments which may
be raised against the New York law, possible equal protection attacks
will be considered seriatim in relation to the various provisions of the
law.
A. Because of Varying Hospital and Medical Charges, Will
the Law's Threshold Provision Result in
Arbitrary Discrimination?
An argument often raised against a "no-fault" plan with a threshold
geared to the dollar amount of medical, hospital and related expenses
is that varying charges for these services will result in the law's
arbitrary discrimination against certain accident victims. 6 3 Since med-
ical charges vary between different locations in a state (or even within
the same city), two persons could sustain identical injuries and be
treated differently in relation to their rights to pursue a tort action for
"pain and suffering" simply because of the location of the accident or
the hospital at which treatment was sought.64 It is an acknowledged
fact that medical and hospital charges vary among communities and
even within the same community. A trial court in Illinois used this
disparity in medical treatment charges as one basis for finding that its
state's "no-fault" law, with a "pain and suffering" limitation similar to
a threshold, was unconstitutional. 65 The court found that the opera-
tion of the law would deny certain state residents equal protection. On
62. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). A stricter test, the compelling state interest
test, will be applied where a fundamental right is threatened, e.g.. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel), or where the classification used is inherently suspect- Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (race).
63. See Note, Equal Protection: No-Fault and the Poor, 36 Albany L. Rev. 727, 728-31
(1972).
64. See No-Fault Note 709-10.
65. Grace v. Howlett, 1972 Auto. Ins. Cas. 7227 (Cook County Cir. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 51 Ill.
2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
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appeal, the statute was declared unconstitutional on other grounds
without reaching the issue considered by the trial court.66 However, in
Manzanares, confronted with a similar attack on the threshold in that
state's "no-fault" law, the court stated:
The Act requires the medical expense standard be calculated on the basis of
"reasonable value" of the medical services, and not on the basis of out-of-pocket
expenses. Actual expenditures for medical treatment are not conclusive as to their
reasonable value. Evidence that the reasonable value of the medical expense was an
amount different than the amount actually charged is admissible in all actions to
which [the threshold] applies.6 7
Thus the Kansas court resolved the constitutional attack on the
operation of the threshold by concluding that the threshold would not
lead to constitutionally impermissible disparities in treatment since the
determination as to whether the amount of medical and related
expenses exceeded its dollar limitation would be made on the basis of
the reasonable value of the services, rather than the "bottom line" on
the claimant's medical bills. It should be noted that the New York
threshold also uses the word "reasonable" in relation to the medical
and related expenses which must exceed $500 before an action for
"pain and suffering" may be pursued. 68 The approach of the Kansas
court is reasonable, especially in light of the principle that statutes in
derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed. The
application of the Kansas approach will not result in all claimants
being treated with mathematical precision. However, such precision is
not required by the equal protection clause. 69
B. Does the Operation of the Threshold Provision
Discriminate Against the Poor?
A variation of the preceding equal protection argument is grounded
on the claim that a dollar amount threshold discriminates against the
poor. 70 This argument again focuses on the example of two persons
sustaining identical injuries in motor vehicle accidents. Here, how-
ever, one person is rich and the other is poor. The threshold discrimi-
nates because the wealthy person will be able to seek and pay for more
66. Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474"(1972) (statute held violative of Illinois
constitutional provision prohibiting enactment of special law when general law is applicable,
violative of right to trial by jury, and violative of restriction prohibiting fee officers in the judicial
system), noted in 8 Gonzaga L. Rev. 146 (1972).
67. - Kan. at -, 522 P.2d at 1309; accord, Opinion of the Justices, - N.H. -, -, 304
A.2d 881, 885 (1973).
68. N.Y. Ins. Law § 671(4)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
69. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37 (1928); Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
70. See Note, Equal Protection: No-Fault and the Poor, 36 Albany L. Rev. 727 (1972).
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expensive medical care than the poor person. It is claimed that the
wealthy person will more readily exceed the threshold amount and be
able to pursue a tort remedy for "pain and suffering." The court in
Manzanares responded to this argument by stating:
Economic disparity in the market place is beyond judicial control. To equate
absolute economic equality with equal protection of the law is absurd. The "reasonable
value" criterion permits sufficient flexibility for the courts of this state to insure that
those who are economically disadvantaged are not deprived of a right enjoyed by the
more affluent. Based upon the standard of "reasonable value" it is clear the medical
expense standard is non-discriminatory upon its face. 7'
Again, the reasoning of the Kansas court should be equally sound with
respect to a similar attack upon the New York threshold. A ghetto
resident in New York City would be free to prove that the reasonable
value of the free medical care he received was more than $500.
Likewise, a liability insurer could argue that the reasonable value of
the medical services received by a Park Avenue resident was less than
$500 even though the actual charge for those services was higher.
The courts in Florida and New Hampshire also have looked to the
language of threshold provisions referring to "reasonable" charges for
medical and related services, and have followed the reasoning of the
Kansas court in finding no equal protection problems in the appli-
cation of the threshold to persons of different financial status. 72
In relation to this argument, it also should be noted that the
"no-fault" law itself operates to create a fund from which the accident
victim of modest means can draw to seek competent medical care
without assuming the role of a "charity case."
C. Does the Application of the Threshold Concept Itself
Result in Discrimination?
Regardless of the application of the New York threshold provision
to persons from different parts of the state or persons of varying
financial status, it is clear that the application of the statute will result
in different treatment for two distinct classes of automobile accident
victims. Those victims with medical and related expenses in excess of
$500 or who sustain one of the specified types of injury set forth in the
threshold provision will be entitled to pursue a tort action for "pain
and suffering." All other automobile accident victims will be unable to
pursue such an action. The question is whether this classification
violates equal protection guarantees.73
71. - Kan. at -, 522 P.2d at 1309.
72. Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, is, 18 (Fla. 1974); Opinion of the Justices, -
N.H. -, -, 304 A.2d 881, 885-86 (1973).
73. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
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The purpose of employing a threshold provision in a "no-fault" law
generally is twofold. First, it is intended to reduce the number of
minor personal injury claims that crowd the courts. Secondly, it is
intended to keep the overall cost of automobile insurance within
reasonable bounds in view of the expanded first party coverage that is
provided. While it is true that the New York legislature might have
selected some other dollar amount or other types of injuries as excep-
tions to the threshold's prohibition against "pain and suffering" ac-
tions, that is not the issue. In Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Co. 74 the
Florida court, analyzing an equal protection attack against its state's
$1000 threshold, stated:
Admittedly, situations can be perceived in which severe pain might be uncompen-
sated, and other situations in which suit could still be brought for extremely minor
intangible damages. But perfection is not required in classifications; "problems of
government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough
accommodations,-illogical, it may be, and unscientific.
7 5
The Florida court's analysis of the legislature's action in establishing
that state's threshold is in fundamental agreement with the United
States Supreme Court's view of the function of legislative demarca-
tions:
[W]hen it is seen that a line or point there must be, and that there is no mathematical
or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature must be accepted
unless we can say that it is very wide of any reasonable mark. 76
Since reference has been made to the Florida court's analysis of the
equal protection problem posed by a threshold which uses a dollar
limitation, it also should be noted that the Florida court did find
constitutional problems in the specific injury exceptions to the
threshold's operation. 77 In addition to the $1000 medical and related
expenses provision in the Florida threshold, the law provided that an
accident victim could pursue a tort action for "pain and suffering"
when the injury or disease resulting from the automobile accident
"consists in whole or in part of permanent disfigurement, a fracture to
a weight-bearing bone, a compound, comminuted, displaced or com-
pressed fracture, loss of a body member, permanent injury within
reasonable medical probability, permanent loss of a bodily function, or
death. "78
74. 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
75. Id. at 17, quoting Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1913).
76. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(quoted in Pinnick v. Cleary, - Mass. at-, 271 N.E.2d at 610-11). See also Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
77. 296 So. 2d at 20-21.
78. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.737(2) (1972).
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In considering this exception, the court in Lasky reasoned that one
person sustaining a simple fracture of the skull (a non-weight bearing
bone) would have no cause of action for "pain and suffering," while
another person sustaining a broken toe (a weight bearing bone) would
be able to sue for "pain and suffering." 79 The court also cited other
instances in which persons with one of the specified injuries could seek
recovery for "pain and suffering" while those incurring less than $1000
of medical expense suffering an injury, equally painful but not
specified in the law, could not so recover. 80 The court found the list of
injuries irrational and held that its application violated the equal
protection guarantee and was therefore unconstitutional. 8 1 Because the
provision was severable, the court held the remainder of the statute
constitutional. 82 Since the court did not find fault with the "death"
exception to the statute, actions for "pain and suffering" resulting from
automobile accidents may be brought in Florida only if the reasonable
medical expenses exceed $1000 or the accident victim dies as a result of
the injuries stemming from the accident.8 3
It is unfortunate that the Florida court, other than finding the list of
injuries "irrational" and giving examples of the different results the
statute's application would produce for accident victims, did not
clearly explain why the application of the list violated the equal
protection clause. It is especially unfortunate for the purposes of this
Article since, but for the "weight-bearing bone" feature, the list of
specific injuries in the New York law84 closely resembles the Florida
law. Both the Massachusetts and Kansas laws have specific injury
provisions" but neither state's court was concerned with the statutes'
equal protection problems. It seems strange, especially in light of the
previously quoted portion of the Florida court's opinion agreeing that
"perfection in classification is not required,"8 6 that it found fault with
79. 296 So. 2d at 20.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 21.
82. Id. at 21-22.
83. Id. at 21.
84. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
85. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 40-3117(b) (1973) lists the following- "permanent disfigurement, a
fracture to a weightbearing bone, a compound, comminuted, displaced or compressed fracture,
loss of a body member, permanent injury within reasonable medical probability, permanent loss
of a bodily function or death." Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 231, § 6D (Supp. 1974) provides for
"sickness or disease [that] (1) causes death, or (2) consists in whole or in part of loss of a body
member, or (3) consists in whole or in part of permanent and serious disfigurement, or (4) results
in . . . loss of sight or hearing . . . or (5) consists of a fracture."
86. 296 So. 2d at 20. "A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against
[the equal protection] clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in




the specific injury form of classification. Surely the purpose of the
legislature should have been recognized. The specific injury exception
shows legislative acknowledgement of the fact that there may be truly
"serious injuries," not intended to be barred from the courts, which, in
Florida's case, would result in medical expenses of less than $1000.
Since the legislative purpose is only to remove cases involving minor
injuries from the court system, and since a pure medical expense
threshold may not be totally effective in doing so, what better means is
available than to combine the medical expense approach with the
specific injury approach? It is true, as the Florida court pointed out,
that toe fractures may be treated differently than skull fractures.
However, without the specific injury list, it is also true that a spinal
disc case with over $1000 in medical expenses will be treated differ-
ently than an eye-out case with less than $1000 in medical expenses.
Imperfections may arise in the application of the specific injury list,
but as the Florida court also noted, equal protection turns on a
classification's reasonable relation to legitimate legislative purpose,
imperfect as the classification may be.
D. Does the Classification Between Auto Torts and Other
Torts Discriminate?
The argument may be raised that the New York law's limitation on
the right to recover "pain and suffering" damages arbitrarily discrimi-
nates against automobile accident victims because the victims of other
tortious conduct will be able to pursue a common law remedy without
legislative interference. Are automobile accident victims discriminated
against as a class?8 7 Manzanares answered this question by stating the
real issue to be whether the limitation on "pain and suffering" damages
was related to the purpose of the law.8 8 It avoided the issue of
distinguishing between the treatment of automobile torts and other
torts. The court reasoned that since one of the purposes of the
"no-fault" law was the elimination of minor claims for "pain and
suffering," a threshold provision which accomplished that objective
was not unconstitutional.8 9
The Michigan trial court in Shavers, 90 considering the constitution-
ality of its state's plan, met the issue more directly. In response to the
87. See note 40 supra, regarding the possibility of a violation of the right to trial by jury, thus
discriminating against automobile accident victims.
88. Manzanares v. Bell, - Kan. -, -, 522 P.2d 1291, 1308 (1974).
89. Id. at -, 522 P.2d at 1308-09.
90. Civil No. 73-248-068-CZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct. May 20, 1974).
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argument that automobile torts cannot be treated differently from
other torts, the court stated:
The automobile tort reparations system has a long history of regulation separate from
other personal injury torts. Financial responsibility laws have been enacted, guest
passenger acts have been passed, and there are many other areas in which the
automobile tortfeasor has been treated differently from other tortfeasors. 9 1
The reasoning of the Kansas and Michigan courts would appear
compelling in the New York situation.
E. Does the Law's Reduction of Benefits by Certain
Collateral Sources Arbitrarily Discriminate?
The New York law provides that the first party benefits required to
be provided by auto insurers are to be reduced by "amounts recovered
or recoverable on account of such injury under state or federal laws
providing social security disability benefits, or workmen's compensation
benefits .... ,,92 It may be argued, on equal protection grounds, that
this provision arbitrarily discriminates since it does not provide for a
similar reduction with respect to benefits received from other sources,
such as private accident and health insurance.
Since consideration was first given to modifying the auto accident
reparation system, questions have been raised as to whether au-
tomobile insurance or other sources should be the primary source of
benefits for auto-related injuries. Proponents of the primacy of auto
insurance claim that motoring should pay its own way with regard to
auto accident losses. The cost of auto accidents, they claim, should be
borne by those who engage in motor vehicle transportation and should
not be spread over the general public-motorists and non-motorists
alike. Those who favor the primacy of other sources of benefits
contend that, because of the widespread availability of collateral
sources of benefits and the low cost/benefit ratio of those sources as
compared to auto insurance, non-auto reparation systems should pre-
dominate.
New York appears to have reached some form of a compromise
between those two poles by having auto insurance primacy as to all
other sources except workmen's compensation and social security
benefits. This result appears to be acceptable even to those who favor
the primacy of auto insurance. In this regard, it may be argued that
workmen's compensation and social security are natural sources of
primary benefits because they are the result of governmental expres-
91. Id. at 45.
92. N.Y. Ins. Law § 671(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
1974] NO-FA ULT
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
sions of the need to protect specific classes of the general public
regardless of the benefits available to those classes from other sources.
From a constitutional standpoint, the Florida Supreme Court, con-
sidering an equal protection attack raised against a reduction provision
in its law, 93 similar to the New York provision, expressed the view
that the classification was constitutionally permissible,
despite the fact that benefits received from other collateral sources need not be so
credited. Unlike workmen's compensation benefits, the other common collateral
sources, such as insurance policies and the like, require separate payments by the
individual; neither are they generally available by virtue of a statutory scheme .... 94
Thus the court found a reasonable basis for the classification to be that
benefits such as workmen's compensation are established under a
statutory scheme and private insurance benefits, also collateral to auto
insurance, are not under such a scheme. The Michigan trial court in
Shavers disagreed with the view of the Florida court, and found it was
arbitrary and discriminatory to reduce the "no-fault" benefits of some
auto accident victims and not others. 95
It appears that the Michigan court failed to see the purpose of the
classification while the Florida court did. Systems providing for
workmen's compensation and social security benefits are products of
legislative decisions that all persons otherwise qualifying for benefits
under the systems are to receive compensation as a matter of public
policy. In addition, from the standpoint of an auto insurer, it is far
easier to ascertain those who will be entitled to workmen's compensa-
tion and social security benefits than it is for the other various sources
of benefits that may be available.
The most compelling argument in favor of the constitutionality of a
set-off provision such as the one in the New York law may be found in
Richardson v. Belcher.9 6 There the Supreme Court upheld the validity
of the workmen's compensation set-off provisions of the Social Security
Act. Nevertheless, this particular constitutional argument against the
laws may be moot. The New York State Department of Insurance has
already ordered Blue Cross and Blue Shield benefits to be paid only
after auto insurance first party coverages have been utilized, 97 making
one of the most widespread forms of private health insurance benefits
secondary to no-fault coverage.
93. Florida, like New York, provides for the primacy of workmen's compensation benefits.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 627.736(4) (1972).
94. Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 21 (Fla. 1974).
95. Civil No. 73-248-068-CZ at 90-91 (Wayne County Cir. Ct. May 20, 1974).
96. 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
97. 11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 52.16(8) (1974).
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F. Does the Exclusion of Motorcycles from the Law's
Insurance Requirements Arbitrarily Discriminate?
Since the New York law requires all "motor vehicles" to be insured
for the requisite first party benefits, 98 and since motorcycles are
excluded from the law's definition of "motor vehicle," 99 this exclusion
may be attacked on equal protection grounds as giving motorcycle
owners a special status not reasonably related to the purpose of the
law. It generally is agreed that a high-limit, first party auto insurance
coverage will be extremely expensive for motorcycle owners. The
reason is obvious. Because the motorcyclist does not have a protective
shield around him as does the occupant of a passenger car, even a low
speed accident is likely to produce substantial injury for a motor-
cyclist.
The Kansas Supreme Court in Manzanares found substantial
enough differences to justify a distinct classification with respect to
insurance coverage.' 00 Pointing out the differences in the physical
characteristics of the vehicles, the ability to sustain injury in one type
of vehicle as opposed to another, and the potential high cost of first
party coverage for the motorcycle owner, the court decided that the
legislature's classification was both reasonable and related to the
purpose of the act.' 0
The Michigan court in Shavers reached a contrary result. 102 It
pointed to the number of motorcycles in the state and the number of
accidents involving those vehicles. It then reasoned that since the
purpose of the state's "no-fault" law was to provide compensation to
persons injured in motor vehicle accidents, the exclusion of motorcy-
cles from the requirement of purchasing first party coverage was not
related to the purpose of the act.' 0 3 The court stated that even though
the insurance costs for motorcycle owners might be high, the avoid-
ance of higher insurance costs is not a purpose of the act. Further-
more, the court noted that a pedestrian could be struck by a motor-
cycle as easily as by another type of vehicle, and non-coverage of
motorcycles would result in no compensation for the pedestrian, in
direct contradiction of the purpose of the act. 104
There are two points which the Michigan court seemed to gloss over
98. N.Y. Ins. Law § 672(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
99. Id. § 671(6)(b).
100. - Kan. at -, 522 P.2d at 1310-11.
101. Id. at -, 522 P.2d at 1310-11.
102. Civil No. 73-248-068-CZ at 64-69 (Wayne County Cir. CL May 20, 1974).
103. Id. at 69.
104. Id. at 67-68.
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and which make the Kansas approach to this issue more persuasive.
First, because of the large number of motorcycles on the roads and the
potentially high cost of first party coverage, compelling motorcyclists
to buy the coverage may force many to seek less expensive forms of
transportation or to operate their motorcycles in violation of the law.
Secondly, if motorcycle owners are not required to carry the coverage,
the tort liability system will still be available to them or the persons
they may injure.
G. Does the Classification in Compensation Levels
Arbitrarily Discriminate?
In addition to providing first party compensation for medical and
related expenses, the New York law requires first party compensation
for loss of earnings and compensation for services the injured person
would have performed for his or her family had there been no injury.
Work loss benefits are set at up to $1,000 per month for no more than
three years. 105 Substituted service benefits are set at up to $25 per day
for not more than one year. 10 6 It may be argued that these benefit
levels, both as to dollar amounts and duration of benefits, arbitrarily
benefit persons working for pay and arbitrarily discriminate against
those who work without pay, such as housewives. 0 7
The court in Shavers considered this argument and found that the
distinction does not of itself make that section of the law constitution-
ally invalid.' 0 8 The court relied on the Michigan legislature's recogni-
tion that those who perform services in the home should receive
compensation for an economic loss even though their services origi-
nally had not been paid for in money.' 0 9 The court also reasoned that
the distinction between workers who receive pay for their services and
those who receive no pay are natural categories able to be validly
classified by the legislature. 110
H. Conclusion-Equal Protection
The question of how equal must equal protection be in order to be
constitutionally permissible is the heart of the issue regarding the
"reasonable" medical expense monetary threshold. In New York,
105. N.Y. Ins. Law § 671(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
106. Id. § 671(I)(c).
107. See Ring, The Fault with "No-Fault," 49 Notre Dame Law. 796, 806-07 (1974).
108. Civil No. 73-248-068-CZ at 78-81 (Wayne County Cir. Ct. May 20, 1974).
109. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 500.3107(2) (Supp. 1974) provides for up to $20.00 per day
for up to three years for non-income producing services performed by the injured for his
dependents' benefit.
110. Civil No. 73-248-068-CZ at 81 (Wayne County Cir. Ct. May 20, 1974).
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regional differences in medical costs undoubtedly will subject identi-
cally injured parties to a varying medical expense threshold standard.
An analogy may be drawn to the so-called "one man one vote" cases
where the argument that the number of voters in each election district
must be identical comes into apparent conflict with the New York
State constitutional mandate that prohibits the unnecessary division of
counties and towns in the drawing of legislative districts."'t In the
landmark "one man one vote" case, Reynolds v. Sims, 112 Chief Justice
Warren, speaking for the Court with reference to mathematical exac-
titude in each legislative district, had the following to say concerning
how equal is equal:
So long as the divergences from a strict population standard are based on legitimate
considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy, some deviations
from the equal-population principle are constitutionally permissible with respect to the
apportionment of seats in either or both of the two houses of a bicameral state
legislature. " 3
The Court of Appeals of the State of New York, in a "one man one
vote" case involving county legislative districts," 14 indicated that when
weighed against other legitimate concerns equal protection does not
mean micrometric equality, and sustained rather substantial popula-
tion deviations in the following language:
Decisions dealing with apportionment of State Legislatures tend to reflect a broader
scope for permissible deviations and a more tolerant attitude toward the practical
justification for deviations .... Similarly, and of particular relevance on this appeal,
the court has indicated a willingness to allow a still broader scope for permissible
deviations from strict population equality and the justification for such deviations
when dealing with local, intrastate legislative bodies.'
While it is impossible to predict the court of appeals' final determi-
nation in the matter, it seems that the most difficult question will be
that of equal protection based on the disparity in medical costs
throughout the state. Some light may be shed on the question by the
reapportionment cases where there is authority for the proposition that
equal protection does not necessarily mean exactly equal.
There are many areas in which a "no-fault" law such as the one in
New York establishes classifications. Classifications, as has been seen,
are not in themselves constitutionally prohibited under the equal
protection clause. What is prohibited are arbitrary and unreasonable
111. N.Y. Const art. Eli, §§ 4-5.
112. 377 U.S. 533, 578-81 (1964).
113. Id. at 579.
114. Abate v. Mundt, 25 N.Y.2d 309, 253 N.E.2d 189, Y.S.2d 465 (1969), aff'd, 403
U.S. 182 (1971).
115. Id. at 315, 253 N.E.2d at 192, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 468-69 (citations omitted).
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classifications. The preceding discussion has hopefully pointed out that
the classifications in the New York law, imperfect though they may
be, are reasonable and related to the general purpose of the law.
IV. CONCLUSION
No-fault in New York appears able to survive a constitutional
attack based on due process, and, with the minor exceptions noted,
appears not to violate the equal protection clause.
